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NOTES
SECTION 1983 AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF POLICE
OFFICERS' INACTION
Violence against women is a serious problem in America today.
Estimates of women battered yearly range from 1 million to 40
million, and a common estimate is that 1.5 million women are
physically assaulted by their partner each year.' Because the prob-
lem has become so prevalent, 2 battered women must be able to rely
upon the legal system to aid them, Police officers are typically the
first source of help for these women, 3 and therefore women depend
upon the officers to render aid. When the officers fail to do so, and
the failure constitutes a breach of a duty, battered women need a
legal remedy against the passive officer.
Since the enactment of section 1983 in 1871, plaintiffs deprived
of their constitutional rights have had a vehicle by which to bring
cases in federal court. 4 The initial inquiry in any section 1983 action
I A. BROWN, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 5 (1987).
A National Institute of Menial Health-funded study of more than '2,000 couples showed
that in any one year, approximately 1.8 million wives are beaten by husbands. BATTERED
WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY II, UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Wash-
ington, D.C., Jan. 30-31, 1978, citing M. Strauss, "Wife Beating: Causes, Treatment and
Research Needs," Consultation Report ( jan. 1978).
3 See Lerman, Expansion of Arrest Power: A Key to Effective Intervention, 7 VT. L. Rev. 59,
59 (1982),
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Colum-
bia.
For a comprehensive history of the adoption of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 169-83 (1961). For a discussion of section 1983, its effect on constitutional
tort litigation, and the subsequent impact on the legal system, see Eisenberg & Schwab, The
Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 641-95 (1987).
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must focus upon whether two essential elements are present. The
first is whether a person acting under color of state law committed
the complained of conduct. 5 The second is whether this conduct
deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States.° Unfortunately, the
judicial branch has been reluctant to extend the section 1983 rem-
edy to female victims of physical abuse by men when these women
have brought claims against local police officers who failed to pro-
vide protection from abusive males.' The difficulty in this area is in
defining the circumstances under which section 1983 applies to acts
of omission.°
Historically, the law condoned a man's right to use physical
force against a woman. 9 Because of this societal attitude, men could
often beat their wives with impunity. Three prevailing ideas seemed
to condone the husband's right to abuse his wife physically. First, it
was the husband's duty to make the wife behave herself.'° Second,
if the wife indeed "required" punishment, it was better for the
husband to administer it privately than to subject his wife to the
scandal of a public trial." Lastly, husbands relied on a long line of
court decisions giving them the privilege to inflict physical punish-
ment upon their wives."
As time passed and societal attitudes changed, the legal system's
response to battered women and domestic violence began to move
away from passive acceptance. 13 The heightened public awareness
of the serious nature of this problem led to the enactment of statutes
5 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) (court stated that defendants' conduct
satisfied the "under color of state law" requirement because they were state employees in
positions of authority when they engaged in the disputed conduct). Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 535 (plaintiff alleged a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution's four-
teenth amendment).
See, e.g., Turner v. City of North Charleston, 675 F. Supp, 314, 319-20 (D.S.C. 1987);
see also Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem,
Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. 11, .Ev. 267, 298-328 (Professor Kathleen Waits provides a
detailed account of the plight of the abused woman and the legal system's historical failure
to provide a remedy).
8 See Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1387 (6th Cir. 1972).
9 Waits, supra note 7, at 268-69.
10 See Slate v. Fulton, 149 N.C. 485, 498, 63 S.E. 145, 149 (1908) (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
II See id.
' 2 See id. at 499, 63 S.E. at 149 (Clark, C.J., dissenting). For a discussion of early American
attitudes towards battered women, see Stedman, Right of Husband to Chastise Wife, 3 VA. L.
REG. 241, 241-48 (1917).
' 3 See Waits, supra note 7, at 268-69.
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in some states that require police officers to arrest men who abuse
women.' 4 Such statutes remove discretion from the police officers
and make arrest mandatory.''
In the absence of such statutes, battered women must seek
other means by which to impose liability upon passive police officers.
Overzealous police officers may be held liable under section 1983
when they use more force than necessary to place a person in
custody,' 6 but courts are Somewhat more reluctant to impose liability
upon police officers who fail to act. 17 Drawing upon the general
principle that a state actor may violate section 1983 by failing to
lend aid to an individual who is in need,'s courts have begun to
recognize that police must assist battered women and must be held
" See Gundle, Civil Liability for Police Failure to Arrest: Nearing v. Weaver, 9 WOMEN'S
R'rs, L. REP. (Rutgers Univ.) 258, 259-60 (Fall 1986). The article traces the history of the
passage of OR. REV. S'I'AT. § 133.055 (1985), which explicitly regMres police officers to make
arrests in certain domestic violence situations. The statute provides, in pertinent part;
[Wjhen a peace officer is at the scene of a domestic disturbance and has probable
cause to believe that an assault has occurred between spouses, former spouses
or adult persons related by blood or marriage or persons of opposite sex residing
together or who formerly resided together, or to believe that one such person
has placed the other in fear of imminent serious physical injury, the officer
shall arrest and take into custody the alleged assailant or potential assailant.
IS See. Waits, supra note 7, at 270 n.12. Footnote 12 of Waits' article gives an extensive
list of articles that discuss the law in various states; Buzawa Buzawa, Legislative Responses to
the Problem of DOmestic Violence in Michigan, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 859 (1979); Gottlieb & Johnson,
Reform in Kansas Domestic Violence Legislation, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 527 (1983); Reatney, Legal
Remedial Alternatives for Spouse Abuse in Texas, 20 Hous. L. Rev. 1279 (1983); Note, Domestic
Abuse Legislation in Illinois and Other States: A Survey and Suggestions Jiff Reform, 1983 U. ILL
L. REv. 261; Comment, Spouse Abuse: Proposal for a New Rule of Thumb, 17 U. Klett. L. REV.
633 (1983).
Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981). In 1961, the United States
Supreme Court held in Monroe v. Pape that a police officer who abuses the authority that he
or she has been given by state law is acting "under color of" state law within the meaning of
section 1983. 365 U.S. 167, 189 (1961). In Shillingford, the court held that, in order to
determine whether a state officer had violated section 1983 through physical abuse of a
suspect in custody, it was necessary to weigh the amount of force used in relation to the need
presented, the extent of the injury inflicted, and the motives of the police officer, Shillingford,
634 F.2d at 265.
17 See, e.g., Turner v. City of North Charleston, 675 F. Supp. 314, 318-20 (D.S.C. 1987).
See generally Note, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983 Liability for Failure to Act, 53 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1048, 1048-73 (1986); Note, Sorichetti v. City of New York Tells the Police that Liability
Looms for Failure to Respond to Domestic Violence Situations, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333, 346-58
(1985); Note, Police Officers' Duly to Rescue or Aid: Are They Only Good Samaritans?, 72 CALIF.
L. REv. 661, 673-86 (1984); Note, Police Liability for Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94
HARV. L. REV. 821, 821-40 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Failure to Prevent Crime].
18 See, e.g., Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1387 (6th Cir. 1972). See infra notes 32-40
and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of this point and of the Azar case,
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accountable for their failure to do so if certain conditions are pres-
ent.' 9
 Some courts have used equal protection analysis as a means
to impose liability upon passive police officers. 2° That is, if a com-
parison between police response to domestic violence calls and po-
lice response to general assault calls reveals that police officers treat
domestic violence calls less seriously, the evidence may be sufficient
to constitute an equal protection violation. 21 Police officers may also
be held liable for failure to aid battered women if a special rela-
tionship exists between the officer and the victim. 22 In 1988, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit attempted to
define clearly the conditions necessary to establish such a special
relationship in recognizing a section 1983 claim against police offi-
cers who failed to lend assistance to a victim of domestic violence
in Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department."
The 1989 United States Supreme Court case of DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services seriously undercuts
the Balistreri court's efforts, and those of other courts, to provide
battered women with a remedy against passive police officers. 24
Prior to DeShaney, courts had imposed a duty to act upon police
officers based on the officers' authority to enforce the law, 25 on
statutorily prescribed duties, 26 and on the theory of a "special
relationship"27 between the victim and the police officer. DeShaney
substantially narrowed the circumstances under which a special re-
lationship may arise, 28 thus forcing lower courts to rely upon alter-
nate legal doctrines to aid battered women.
This note examines the avenues that are still open to battered
women who sue passive police officers, including the limited special
relationship concept. Section 1 surveys the various theories that
19 See, e.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1527 (D. Conn. 1984).
See infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of Thurman.
2') See Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kansas, 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988).
21 See id. at 695-96.
See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept, 855 F.2d 1421, 1426 (9th Cir. 1988). But see
DeShaney v. Winnebago County 1)ep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1004-05 & n.4 (1989),
aff'g 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987).
2 ' Balistreri, 855 F.2d at 1426. The holding in Balistreri was disapproved in DeShaney, 109
S. Ct. at 1004 n.4 (1989). In DeShaney, the United States Supreme Court held that a state
that fails to protect a citizen from private violence has not violated the due process clause,
thus precluding any section 1983 action against the state actor. Id. at 1004.
24
 109 S. Ct. at 1004, n.4.
25 See, e.g., Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1972).
26 See, e.g., Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1978).
27 See, e.g., Lowers v. City of Streator, 627 F. Supp. 244, 246 (N.D. III. 1985).
2' 1
 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
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courts have applied to determine when police officers have a duty
to act.29 Section II explores the way that courts have utilized the
duty-to-act theories in evaluating section 1983 claims of battered
women against police officers." Section III analyzes the law regard-
ing battered women and offers some recommendations to these
women who bring section 1983 claims against passive police offi-
cers. 31 Section IV concludes that the enactment of statutes imposing
liability on police officers who fail to take the proper action to
protect battered women is the most effective solution to the prob-
lem.
I. FAILURE TO ACT UNDER SECTION 1983
The language of section 1983 seems to require that a state actor
undertake some affirmative act before he or she falls within the
statute's purview. 32 Therefore, the threshold question in this area
is whether a police officer's failure to act comes within the reach of
words such as "cause" or "subject," which both imply positive action.
There are a variety of theories under which section 1983 liability
has been held to apply to police officers' failure to act. Under the
law enforcement theory, a police officer who ignores the duty im-
posed upon him by his office and fails to aid someone who is within
the officer's reach may be held liable under section 1983." The
courts have also relied upon statutes that impose upon police offi-
cers a duty to act under certain conditions. 34 Finally, the courts have
developed the special realtionship concept, under which police have
a duty to act under narrow circumstances."
The failure-to-act doctrine is one that the courts began to de-
velop outside of the battered women context. In 1972, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in Azar v. Conley
that section 1983 is applicable to acts of omission as well as com-
mission." Thus, an officer's failure to take steps to aid an individ-
ual—an omission—may be actionable under section 1983, just as an
officer's actions (i.e., police brutality)—commission—may be deemed
29 See infra notes 32-116 and accompanying text.
"" See infra notes 117-75 and accompanying text.
" See infra...notes 176-224 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 4 for the text of § 1983.
35 See Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1972).
34 See Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1978).
35 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1004-05
(1989) for a discussion or the currrent state of the special relationship concept.
3' 456 F.2d 1382, 1387 (6th Cir. 1972).
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actionable." In Azar, Mr. Conley and his friends and relatives ha-
rassed and intimidated Mr. Azar and the other members of his
family." The Akron police took no action to assist the Azars. Mr.
Conley was a police officer, and the plaintiffs alleged that the mem-
bers of the force did not want to say anything about possible wrong-
doing by a fellow officer.
The defendant police officers in Azar argued that, to state a
claim under section 1983, a complaint must allege action, not merely
inaction, by public officials. 39
 In holding that section 1983 applied
to acts of omission as well as commission, the Azar court disagreed
with the defendants and stated that the defendants fundamentally
misunderstood the remedy afforded by section 1983. According to
the court, section 1983 was a remedy that was intended to protect
citizens' fourteenth amendment rights when state law did not.
Therefore, the Azar court held that, due to the remedial purpose
behind section 1983, inaction on the part of police officers may
result in liability under the statute.°
Police officers, simply by donning their uniforms, hold them-
selves out as people who will provide protection and assistance to
citizens who need it. Police may have a duty to act stemming from
the law enforcement authority that they possess if the plaintiff can
show a causal connection between this duty to protect and the
injury. 4 ' In 1967, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois held in Huey v. Barloga that a black man who was
beaten by a gang of white youths had no section 1983 claim against
police officers for failure to provide protection because the police
had not engaged in any specific omissions that caused the injury. 42
In Huey, a black college student, seeking employment in Cicero,
was walking down the sidewalk at approximately 10:00 P.M.° A
group of four white youths beat Huey severely, inflicting injuries
that later caused his death.'" The plaintiff alleged that the police
were aware of the racial tensions in Cicero and that blacks were not
safe on the public streets.°
37 See id.
3 ' Id. at 1384.
39 Id. at 1387.
40
4 , See Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864,872-73 (N.D. 111.1967).
47 Id. at 867-68,873.
' 3 Id. at 867.
41 Id. at 867-68.
45 Id. at 868.
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The Huey court held that the police officers' lack of specific
omissions precluded the plaintiff's section 1983 claim. 46 The Huey
court reasoned that, although police officers are under an affir-
mative duty to preserve law and order and to protect the personal
safety of persons in the community, the plaintiff's mere conclusory
allegation that the police had notice of the daily presence of blacks
in the community and the possibility of racial disorder did not state
a claim under section 1983." The court noted that, in the absence
of specific omissions by the police officers and a clear causal con-
nection between the omissions and the harm suffered by Huey, he
could not sustain his section 1983 claim." Therefore, police officers
will not be held liable every time a citizen is injured and they fail
to lend aid unless the failure constitutes a breach of their public
responsibility.'"
In 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit was presented with such specific omissions in the case of
Byrd v. Brishke. 5° The Byrd court, emphasizing the combination of
the law enforcement authority with awareness of the consequences
of a neglect of duty, held that a police officer who ignored the duty
imposed by his office and failed to stop other officers who beat a
third person in his presence or otherwise within his knowledge was
liable under section 1983. 5 ' In Byrd, the plaintiff Mr. Byrd received
a bullet wound in the right thigh in a barroom shooting. 52 As he
tried to walk away from the tavern in his injured state, a police
officer escorted him back inside. When Byrd went to a telephone
booth to try and make a call, some police officers dragged him from
the booth and began to beat him.
The Byrd court held that a police officer may not ignore his
duty and escape section 1983 liability, especially when an unlawful
act takes place right in his presence." The Byrd court agreed with
the plaintiff's theory that police officers could be liable under sec-
tion 1983 for failing to intervene when their fellow officers sum-
marily beat a person in the non-participating officers' presence."
hi. at 867-68, 873.
47 Id. at 872-73.
" Id. at 873.
l"See
5" 486 F.2(1 6,11 (7th Cir. 1972).
5 ' Id.
52 141, at 9,
53 Id, at 11.
54 Id.
1364	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW-REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:1357
The court reasoned that it did not want to insulate officers from
liability when those officers could reasonably foresee the conse-
quences of the neglect of their duty to enforce the laws. 55 Thus,
when a section 1983 plaintiff can show a specific omission by a
police officer, such as when a beating happens in the officer's pres-
ence and he does nothing, and a causal connection exists between
the omission and the plaintiff's injury, section 1983 will provide
relief. 56
In addition to an officer's duty to act stemming from his law
enforcement authority, statutes and regulations may also impose an
affirmative duty on police officers to act in certain situations. 57 Such
statutes may remove discretion from police officers and require
them to perform certain functions.° In 1978, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Johnson v. Duffy that
the county sheriff's omission to act could subject him to liability
under section 1983 because he violated duties imposed upon him
by statute and regulations. 59 A state statute imposed upon the sheriff
a duty to appoint members to a classification committee, and this
committee was required by law to meet at least once weekly to assign
prisoners to the various county adult detention facilities and to
transfer prisoners among such facilities. 60 The committee's failure
to meet or act upon prisoner Johnson's transfer resulted in the loss
of money he had earned at an honor camp." Because the sheriff
was responsible for the committee, his failure to see that it met
caused the prisoner's loss. 62
The Johnson court held that a state officer's violation of a stat-
utorily imposed duty provided a proper basis for section 1983 lia-
bility.° The Johnson court reasoned that to deny the prisoner his
money without some type of notice or hearing violated his rights
secured by the fourteenth amendment." According to the court,
55 Id.
56 See id.
57 See, e.g., Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306, 1314 (D.C. App. 1983).
Although the court declined to impose liability on a police captain in a non-section 1983
action for failing to protect the wife of another officer, it pointed out in dicta that "a statute
or regulation may describe a special duty to a particular class of individuals." Id.
55 See .supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
w 588 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1978).
''" Id. at 743.
6 ' Id. at 742.
62 Id. at 743.
64 Id. at 744.
64 Id. at 744-45.
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such violations by state officials are the type for which section 1983
provides a remedy. The Johnson court's holding established that
statutorily defined duties aid courts in analyzing the required causal
connection between the state actor's omission and the individual's
injury.
In addition to statutory duties, courts have generally agreed
that a police officer's failure to act may result in section 1983 liability
when there is a "special relationship" between the police and the
victim.° In the past, the circuits disagreed on the factors that iden-
tify this special relationship.° One way in which a special realtion-
ship may arise between police officers and an individual is when
the police officers cause harm to the person in performing their
duty or when the person is assisting them and is thereby injured.
In 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held in White v. Rochford that there is an affirmative duty on the
part of police officers to protect those who have been endangered
due to the performance of •official duties and that section 1983
liability will result for failure to provide such protection.°
In While, defendant police officers stopped and arrested a
driver for drag racing." The driver was accompanied by his nieces
and nephews and pleaded with the officers to take them to the
police station or a phone booth so that they could contact their
parents. The officers refused and left all three children in the
abandoned automobile on the side of the road. The children suf-
fered mental pain and anguish as a result of being left in the car
and later of having to cross eight lanes of traffic on a freeway to
reach a phone booth. Plaintiffs also alleged that one of the children
was asthmatic and had to be hospitalized for one week.°
63 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police I)ep't, 855 F.2d 1421, 1426 (9th Cir. 1988). But see
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1005-06 (1989), arg
812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987). See also Note, Failure to Prevent Crime, supra note 17, at 824
(citing cases). The liability of police officers under tort principles is quite different from their
liability under section 1983. When faced with the problem of section 1983 actions against
police officers, however, the courts have utilized the special relationship concept. See Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 277 (1985) (Supreme Court stated that tort analogies are quite useful
in establishing the elements of a section 1983 cause of action).
See 'infra note 74 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court has
attempted to resolve this disagreement. In DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004, 1006, the Court held
that a special relationship between the state and an individual does not arise unless the state
places the individual into custody and holds the person there against his or her will.
67 592 F.2d 38I, 384 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979).
68 id. at 382.
8u Id.
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The White court held that section 1983 imposes liability upon
police officers who place citizens in dangerous situations and then
do nothing to neutralize the danger. 7° The White court reasoned
that, if the police had been transporting the children themselves
and had abandoned them on the highway, their action would be
subject to a section 1983 claim. 7 ' According. to the court, it would
not be logical to distinguish between such an act and the failure of
the police to aid the children when the resulting harm was the
same.72
The dissent in White argued that there should be a distinction
between the duty owed to the uncle, once arrested, and the absence
of duty owed to the children, against whom no action was taken. 73
The circuits have disagreed on the issue of whether the special
relationship may arise outside of the custodial situation into which
the uncle was placed, 74 a disagreement that was settled by the United
7° Id. at 384 n.6.
" Id. at 384.
Id. at 384-85. The White court rioted the existence of an Illinois statute, ILL. REV.
STA•. ch. 23, para. 2368 (1975), regarding the abandonment of children: "Any person who
shall wilfully and unnecessarily expose to the inclemency of the weather, or shall in any other
manner injure in health or limb, any child, apprentice or other person under his legal control
shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." Id. at 384 n.6. The White court did not use the statute in
its analysis, but pointed out the policy of protecting children in the community. Id. at 385
n.6. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of a case in which the
court used a statute in its analysis.
73
 White, 592 F.2d at 392 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting); see also Green v. Cauthen, 379 F.
Supp. 361, 369 (D.S.C. 1974) (court held that a person who is arrested and confined is
entitled to medical attention if required and that failure to provide such constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment and is actionable under section 1983); Gardner v. Village of Chicago
Ridge, 71 III. App. 2d 373, 379, 219 N.E.2d 147, 150 (1966) (court held that police who
asked the plaintiff to come to the place of apprehension to identify suspects owed him a duty
to protect him against injury from the suspected persons), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971);
Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 86, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 274, 154 N.E.2d 534, 540
(1958) (court used a reciprocal duty theory to hold that a special relationship had been
established when an individual supplied information leading to an arrest and later received
threatening letters as a result of it becoming publicly known that he had been instrumental
in the arrest). Although neither Gardner nor Schuster was a section 1983 action, the cases are
useful in determining how courts have defined the special relationship in ihe past.
° See Ketchum v. County of Alameda, 811 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1987) (court listed
the following factors to consider in defining the special relationship: whether there is a
custodial relationship created or assumed by the state; whether the state is aware of a specific
risk of harm to the plaintiff; or whether the state has affirmatively placed the plaintiff in a
position of danger); Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923, 927 (8th Cir.
1987) (expressly disagreeing with the Third and Fourth Circuits' holdings that a special
relationship requiring affirmative protection can exist outside of a prison environment, court
would require "the massive state control found in the prison environment" for a special
relationship to exist); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir. 1986)
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States Supreme Court in 1989 in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services. 7' By answering this question in the
negative, the dissent in White anticipated the Court's reasoning in
DeShaney.
Prior to DeShaney, a special relationship may have arisen be-
tween the police and an individual if the police had knowledge that
this person faced a specific danger or risk of harm, even though
the police may not have created the danger. 7° For example, in 1985,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
held in Lowers v. City of Streator that the police department's aware-
ness that a woman faced special danger of a repeat rape established
a special relationship between the woman and the police and gave
rise to a section 1983 claim when the police failed to provide .ade-
quate protection."
In 1987, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Texas implicitly reaffirmed the rule in Lowers v. City of Streator.
The Texas court held in Sherrell v. City of Longview that a special
relationship and hence a duty to protect may exist where the police
have knowledge of specific threats of violence to an individual victim
by a known attacker, yet the police refuse to act. 78 The police offi-
(In deciding whether a custodial or other relationship existed for purposes of creating a duty
of protection, the court considered whether the victim was in the state's custody; whether
the state affirmatively committed itself to protecting the victim; and whether the state knew
of the victim's plight.); Estate of Gilmore v, Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 721 (1st Cir. 1986) (court
noted that if the state assumes responsibility for a person's welfare, a special relationship
may be created between the state and that person), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); Jensen
v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 194 (4th Cir. 1984) (court stated that the right to affirmative
protection is not limited by a determination that there is a custodial relationship because a
right to protection could arise from some other relationship), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052
(1985). This disagreement among the circuits was settled by DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1004 n.4, 1006 (1989), afrg 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.
1987), In DeShaney, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that a special
relationship can arise between the state and an individual when the state has not assumed
custody over the individual. Id. at 1004-05. The DeS,..tney Court reasoned that the law does
not impose a duty to act upon the state simply because of the state's knowledge that an
individual Paces special danger or its statement of intent to lend aid to him or her. Id. at
1006. Rather, the Court stated, the state only has a duty to protect an individual who is in
its custody because the state has thereby deprived that person of the freedom to protect him
or herself. Id.
75 109 S. Ct. at 1004-05.
75 The United States Supreme Court rejected this proposition in DeShaney. Id. at 1005—
06.
77 627 F. Supp. 244, 245-46 (N.D. III. 1985).
75 683 F. Supp. 1108, 1113 (E.D. Tex. 1987). The United States Supreme Court rejected
this proposition in DeShaney. 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
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cers' failure to render assistance when they possess such knowledge
will result in a cognizable section 1983 claim."
Nevertheless, the simple fact that police officers' duties include
aiding people in distress does not imply that section 1983 liability
will always follow for failure to rescue. In 1983, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in Jackson v. City of
Joliet that a mere failure to rescue does not create a justiciable section
1983 claim just because the defendant is a public official whose
duties include aiding people in distress. 8°
In Jackson, plaintiff Jerry Ross was driving his car down a road
in the city of Joliet accompanied by a companion, who was six
months pregnant. For some unknown reason, the car swerved off
the road, crashed, and burst into flames.'" Two minutes later, a
Joliet police officer came upon the scene. Although the car's wheels
were spinning, its lights were on, its motor was running, and it was
burning, the officer made no attempt to determine whether it was
occupied and did not call an ambulance. The police officer called
the fire department and returned to the road to direct traffic away
from the scene of the accident. The fire department extinguished
the fire approximately forty minutes after the call was made, and it
was at this time that the officer and his colleagues at the scene
noticed the victims slumped in the front seat of the car. 82 The police
made no attempt to remove or assist either occupant, but did call
an ambulance, which arrived approximately seven minutes later.
Both occupants and the fetus died in the accident.
The Jackson court held that a police officer's failure to rescue
does not, in and of itself, create a justiciable section 1983 claim.'
The Jackson court reasoned that the purpose behind the Constitu-
tion is to prevent the government from doing too much to the
people and not to require the government to do more for them. 84
The court declined to interpret the fourteenth amendment as a
mandate that the state force some of its citizens to provide services
to others." The Jackson court thus established that a police officer's
79 Sherrell, 683 F. Supp. at 1113. After DeShaney, however, neither the Lowers court's
analysis nor the Sherrell court's analysis is valid.
"" 715 F.2d 1200,1202 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
8 l
 Id. at 1201.
82 Id. at 1201-02.
88 Id. at 1202-03.
84 Id. at 1203.
85
 Id. at 1203-04.
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failure to rescue, even a failure rising to the level of gross negli-
gence, would not be a colorable section 1983 claim."
A related principle in the application of the special relationship
concept is the idea that if the police are unaware of a special risk
to an individual and do nothing to create the dangerous situation,
no special relationship arises. In 1986, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Escamilla v. City of Santa Ann
that police officers faced no section 1983 liability for failure to
protect citizens from a dangerous situation that the officers neither
created nor exacerhated. 87 In Escamilla, two undercover officers
were at a bar when a shooting occurred, a shooting that they took
no action to prevent. 88 Prior to the shooting, the officers witnessed
a fight, and they knew that one of the participants had a criminal
record. Moreover, the officers saw a gun protruding from this
individual's pocket. Mary Medina, who was an innocent bystander
in the bar, was killed in the subsequent shooting. Ms. Medina's
children brought a section 1983 claim against the City of Santa Ana
and the two undercover police officers.
The Escamilla court held that police officers face no section
1983 liability for failing to protect citizens when the police officers
had no involvement in the creation of the dangerous situational`-'
The Escamilla court reasoned that there was no egregious miscon-
duct on the part of the officers and that their mere presence did
not create a special relationship between themselves and the vic-
tim." Therefore, because the officers had only been negligent and
had not contributed to the risk of harm to Ms. Medina, their failure
to act did not create a cognizable section 1983 claim. 9 '
Both the Jackson and Escamilla courts accurately anticipated the
United States Supreme Court's application of the special relation-
ship concept. In the 1989 case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court addressed the con-
cept of a special relationship between r state and an individual
arising out of the state's knowledge that the individual faces a special
risk of harm.92 The DeShaney Court held the state's knowledge of
84 Id. at 1202, 1206.
87 796 F.2d 266, 270 (9th Cir. 1986).
8' Id. at 267.
"Id. at 270.
g° Id.
91 Id.
92 109 S. Ct. 998, 1004 (1989), aff'g 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir, 1987).
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danger of physical harm to an individual, combined with its asserted
intention to provide protection from the danger, insufficient to
establish a special relationship." The DeShaney Court interpreted
the case law as establishing the proposition that there is no special
relationship and subsequent duty for the state to lend aid to an
individual unless the state has placed the individual in its custody."
The DeShaney Court noted further that, even if the state voluntarily
minimized the danger to an individual, the action would not estab-
lish a special relationship so long as the state had done nothing to
create the danger in the first place. 95 Thus, the DeShaney Court
significantly narrowed the circumstances under which a special re-
lationship between the state and an individual may arise. 96
In DeShaney, plaintiff Joshua DeShaney and his father moved
to Neenah, Wisconsin while Joshua was still an infant, following the
DeShaney's divorce. 97 Mr. DeShaney remarried and divorced again,
and his second wife informed the Winnebago County authorities,
at the time of their divorce, that Mr. DeShaney had abused Joshua
in the past and had injured him. Mr. DeShaney denied these
charges, and the Winnebago County Department of Social Services
(DSS) did not look into the situation any further.
One year later, upon examining Joshua and noticing multiple
bruises and injuries, a physician at a local hospital suspected child
abuse and notified DSS. 98 A Wisconsin juvenile court issued an
order to DSS, allowing the hospital to take temporary custody of
Joshua. Three days later, DSS and several other child protection
officials concluded that they could not leave Joshua in the court's
custody because of a lack of evidence of child abuse.
One month later, an emergency room employee informed a
DSS caseworker that Joshua had again been treated for suspicious
injuries, but the caseworker took no action. 99 During the next six
months, the same caseworker visited the DeShaney home monthly
and noticed that there were suspicious injuries on Joshua's head.")
Although the caseworker maintained an accurate record of her
" Id.
NI See id. & 11A.
" Id. at 1006.
4" See id at 1004, 1006-07.
" Id. at 1001.
ox
" Id.
Id. The caseworker also observed that Mr. DeShaney was not living up to his agree-
ment with DSS. Id.
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observations, she did nothing else. 1 °' Approximately four months
later, emergency room personnel again informed DSS that they had
treated Joshua for injuries that appeared to have been caused by
child abuse. 102 Mr. DeShaney informed the caseworker that Joshua
was too ill to see her on her next two visits to see Joshua at home.'"
DSS again did nothing further.
Four months later, Mr. DeShaney beat his four-year old son so
severely that Joshua fell into a life-threatening coma. 104 The brain
damage was so extensive that Joshua will live the rest of his life in
an institution for profoundly retarded persons. The state subse-
quently tried and convicted Mr. DeShaney of child abuse.
Joshua's mother then filed a section 1983 action against DSS
and various individual employees of DSS, alleging that their failure
to protect him from his father's violence, a danger of which they
were aware or should have been aware, deprived Joshua of his
liberty without due process of law under the fourteenth amend-
ment.' 05 In affirming the Seventh Circuit's denial of Ms. DeShaney's
section 1983 claim, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that
the language of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
limits the state's power to act, but it does not oblige the state to
provide safety and security to its citizens."'" In rejecting Ms. De-
Shaney's special relationship argument, the DeShaney Court noted
that the state does have a duty to care for and protect certain
individuals under specifically defined circumstances)°7 The De-
Shaney Court then limited the imposition of this duty to situations
in which the state has either incarcerated prisoners or committed
mental patients against their will.'" The Court reasoned that the
state may not constitutionally place an individual in a situation in
which he or she is unable to care for him or herself and then refuse
to provide basic bodily requirements.'" Thus, because of the De-
Shaney Court's requirement that there be a custodial relationship
between the state and an individual before the state will be com-
:.1 Id.
Id.
boy at 1001-02.
Id. at 1002. Surgeons performing brain surgery on Joshua found a series of hemor-
rhages caused by a long period of traumatic head injuries. Id.
pus Id.
""' Id. at 1002-03. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in relevant part: "[Mot- shall
any state deprive any person of lift, liberty, or property, without due process of law . ..."
117 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004-05.
'" Id. at 1005.
ut9
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pelled to provide affirmative protection to that individual, a person
who receives inadequate protection from the state outside of the
state's custody must rely upon state tort law for a remedy."°
Justice Brennan dissented from the majority opinion in De-
Shaney, arguing that the Court had analyzed the situation from the
wrong perspective."' Instead of focusing on the state's inaction,
Justice Brennan examined the actions that the state had already
taken with respect to Joshua and other similarly situated children." 2
He reasoned that a state's inaction becomes more constitutionally
relevant when examined in light of the state's prior action." 3
Justice Brennan took issue with the DeShaney majority's require-
ment that the state have direct physical control over an individual
before there is a special relationship between them." 4 Justice Bren-
nan reasoned that a state's knowledge of an individual's dangerous
situation and its declarations of intent to aid that person may hinder
the individual's ability to act on his or her own behalf as much as
physical restraint can." Justice Brennan argued that Wisconsin law
places a duty on DSS to handle all reports of child abuse and thus
relieves private citizens of the obligation to lend aid to abused
children." 6 Thus, Justice Brennan would have allowed Ms. De-
Shaney's section 1983 claim because in his view, the state had pre-
cluded Joshua from relying on the protection of private citizens
and then had failed to prevent harm to Joshua according to its duty.
Prior to DeShaney, the courts had struggled to define the special
relationship and the factors that will bring it into existence. After
DeShaney, when victims of crime report the incident to the police
and positively identify the perpetrator, the notice is insufficient to
establish a special relationship between the police and the victim.
When the police officers themselves create the danger and then do
nothing to help potential victims, however, these victims may be
able to rely upon the special relationship concept to impose section
1983 liability on the police. Lastly, when the police are merely
present at the scene of a dangerous situation that they did nothing
11 ° Id. at 1005-07.
111 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" 3 Id.
"4 Id. Justice Brennan cited White v. City of Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979),
for the proposition that state action other than actual physical restraint may be relevant in
special relationship analysis. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text for a complete
discussion of White.
15 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 1010-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to create, and none of those present faces any kind of special
danger, but is nonetheless harmed, then these individuals will be
unable to rely on the special relationship analysis to establish section
1983 liability of the police.
Police officers' liability for failure to act may stem from the
general duty imposed by their law enforcement authority, from
statutes and regulations, or from a narrowly defined special rela-
tionship between the police and the victim. Women have employed
some of these theories, and even some additional ones, in holding
police officers liable when the officers fail to give assistance to
battered women.
II. POLICE OFFICERS' FAILURE TO RENDER ASSISTANCE TO
BATTERED WOMEN
The problem of women battering has existed for quite a long
time in western civilization.' ' 7 More recently, records from the mid-
70s at Boston City Hospital showed that 70% of all assault cases
treated at the emergency room were women beaten by their hus-
bands." 8 Because of the severity of the problem, domestic violence
is an area in which several state legislatures have enacted statutes
that both impose upon police officers the duty to act and protect
the police when they do act."° In the absence of an applicable
statute, women must rely upon alternative theories to obtain relief
from police who fail to act.' 2°
Courts have applied the special relationship concept to cases in
which police officers have failed to help battered women. After
" 7 See Waits, supra note 7, at 267, citing Davidson, Wife Heating: A Recurring Phenomenon
Through flistoty, in BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIot.ENcE 2
(M. Roy ed. 1977).
lIP D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 12 (1979).
" 9 See e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(6) (1979) ("Whenever a law enforcement
officer has reason to believe that a family or household member has been abused, the officer
shall immediately use all available means to prevent further abuse, including . [a]rresting
the abusing party with or without a warrant . . . ."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5013-4 (Supp. 1983)
("A law enforcement officer shall arrest and take a person into custody if the officer has
probable cause to belieVe that the person has violated a court order excluding the person
from the residence or household occupied by a victim of domestic violence or directing the
person to refrain from harassing or interfering with the victim . . ."); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-6-8(2) (1989) ("Whenever any peace officer has reason to believe that an adult family
member is being abused, . . . that officer shall use all reasonable means to prevent further
abuse, including ... arresting and taking into physical custody the assailant "); see also
Lerman, supra note 3, at 67-68.
'" See, e.g., Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 857 F.2d 690,695 (10th Ci•. 1988) (no
applicable statute, so court utilized equal protection analysis in recognizing section 1983
claim).
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DeShaney, courts are limited in the extent to which they may use the
special relationship concept. In addition to this theory, courts have
also employed equal protection analysis to aid battered women.
That is, courts may compare police response to domestic violence
calls to police response to other calls. If the officers consistently
treat domestic violence calls with less care than they treat other calls,
the evidence may be sufficient to establish an intent to discriminate
against women.
Courts will often compare the way that police treat domestic
violence calls to the way that they treat other calls for assistance in
deciding whether to impose liability under an equal protection the-
ory. In 1984, the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut held in Thurman v. City of Torrington that police officers
would be subject to section 1983 liability for failure to take reason-
able measures to protect the safety of women when the police have
notice of the possibility of attacks on these women in domestic
relationships. 121
The plaintiff, Ms. Thurman, notified the city of Torrington
through its police officers that her estranged husband made re-
peated threats upon her life.' 22 The Thurman court focused on the
police officers' indifference to Ms. Thurman's calls for help. 125 First,
she continually pleaded with the police to offer her some measure
of protection,' 24 and she filed several formal complaints with the
police against her estranged husband.' 25 Second, Ms. Thurman
sought and received a restraining order against her husband. The
order forbade Mr. Thurman from assaulting, threatening, and ha-
rassing Ms. Thurman.
Approximately a month after the court issued the order, Mr.
Thurman appeared at Ms. Thurman's residence and began to stab
her repeatedly in the neck, chest, and throat. 126 The police did not
arrive until 25 minutes after Ms. Thurman's call, and even after
arriving on the scene did nothing while Mr. Thurman kicked Ms.
12 ' 595 F. Stipp. 1521, 1527 (I). Conn. 1984).
122 Id. at 1524.
' 25 SPE' id. at 1528-29.
' 24 Id. at 1529. During one incident, a police officer stood on the street watching Mr.
Thurman scream threats at Ms. Thurman and break the windshield of the car while she was
inside the vehicle. Id. at 1525. He was arrested, convicted of breach of the peace, and given
a suspended sentence and two year "conditional discharge." Id. The discharge ordered him
to stay completely away from Ms. Thurman and to commit no further crimes. Id.
'2.5
	 at 1524-25.
126 Id.
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Thurman in the head.' 27 Mr. Thurman then went inside the house
and took his son outside, dropping him on top of his wounded
mother. It was not until Mr. Thurman approached Ms. Thurman
while she was lying on the stretcher that the police arrested him
and took him into custody.
The Thurman court held that repeated police failure to answer
domestic violence calls amounted to administering the Connecticut
law prohibiting assault in a discriminatory fashion and gave rise to
section 1983 liability. 128 The Thurman court rejected the notion that
it is a husband's prerogative to discipline his wife physically, and
the fact that a husband and wife relationship exists between an
assailant and a victim is an insufficient reason for police officers to
refrain from interfering. 129 Thus, the Thurman court established
that police must respond equally to assault victims, whether in a
domestic violence situation or not, and that section 1983 liability
will result for failure to act."()
Some courts have been willing to examine statistical data to
determine how police officers have treated victims of domestic vio-
lence and whether the treatment constitutes an equal protection
violation. In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held in Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kansas that the police
may not lawfully afford less protection to victims of domestic vio-
lence than to victims of nondomestic attacks. 131 Because the findings
in Watson implicated the equal protection rights of the fourteenth
amendment, the court held that the plaintiff had a section 1983
claim against the police department.'"
127 Id. at 1525-26.
1 " Id. at 1527. Fur an excellent and comprehensive analysis or the Thurman case and the
equal protection issue as it applies to battered women in general, see Note, Battered Women
and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Cmistitution Help Them When the Police Won't?, 95 YALE
L.J. 788, 790-805; see also Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp. 574, 576-77 (W.D.
Mich, 1986). Bartalone was also a domestic violence case that was decided on equal protection
grounds, with the court holding that a police officer who is under a duty to protect persons
within the area of his authority must do so on a fair and equal basis. Id. at 577.
1" Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1528.
0" Id. at 1527, 1531.
131 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988). Although the main focus of this note is police
officers' liability for failure to act, plaintiffs can also sue the town or municipality under
section 1983 if they can show that the police officers carried out their actions pursuant to an
unconstitutional policy or custom promulgated by the official policymakers. See id. at 695;
see also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 (1985), reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 925
(1985); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
1 " Mason, 857 F.2d at 695. See supra note 6 and accompanying text for a similar point
about fourteenth am et idment rights,
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Because the Watson case involved an equal protection claim, the
plaintiff Ms. Watson had the burden of demonstrating that she was
treated differently because of her membership in a certain class.'"
Courts have held that, although there is no general right to police
protection, police officers may not refuse to protect a certain group
or class of people under the same circumstances that they would
protect others.'" Thus, all members of the public are entitled to
equal treatment in the provision of police protection.' 35
The Watson case involved a long history of domestic violence
that spanned a period of approximately five years.' 36 The plaintiff,
Nancy Watson, was married to Ed Watson in 1979) 37 Ed Watson
abused his wife during their marriage, and they were divorced in
1981. A few clays before the divorce, Ed Watson threatened his wife
with a knife. When Ms. Watson called the police, the responding
officers told her that if she ever called the police again, they would
arrest her and take her children away from her.
In 1982, Ed and Nancy Watson began to see each other again,
and the two were subsequently remarried.'" There were numerous
incidents of her husband physically abusing her, complaints to the
police, and inaction on their part.'" Nancy Watson filed for divorce
in 1983, and the two separated.' 4° The violent relationship culmi-
nated in an incident in which Ed Watson followed Nancy home,
forced the family into the house, locked the dead bolts, and ripped
out the telephone. He locked the children in their room and raped,
beat, and stabbed Nancy. Ed Watson committed suicide shortly after
the incident.
To support its holding that police response to domestic violence
calls constituted an equal protection violation, the Watson court
relied on statistics presented by the plaintiff, which showed arrest
rates in nondomestic assault cases in Kansas City, Kansas, to be
"3 Watson, 857 F.2d at 696.
"4 Id.; see Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp. 574, 577 (W.D. Mich. 1986);
Lowers v. City of Streator, 627 F. Supp. 244, 246 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
'" See Bartalone, 643 F. Supp. at 577. For a general discussion of equal protection analysis,
see generally -FRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Ch. 16.
w See Watson, 857 F.2d at 692-93.
"3 Id. at 692.
158 Id. During all these incidents, Ed Watson was also employed as a police officer with
the Kansas City, Kansas Police Dept. In addition to the complaints filed by his wife, the
department had notice of the situation through a psychological evaluation administered by
the department's Internal Affairs Unit. Id.
' 39 Id. at 692-93.
NG Id. at 693.
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significantly higher than those in domestic assault cases."' Ms. Wat-
son also presented evidence that the training police officers received
for domestic violence encouraged them to "defuse" the situation
and use arrest as a last resort."'
Although the Watson court supported the jury's finding that
the police afforded less protection to victims of domestic' assault
than to other assault victims, it affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment for the police on Ms. Watson's claim of class-
based discrimination based on sex because she had failed to show
that the classification was adopted purposefully to discriminate
against women.' 45 Thus, the Watson court established the principle
that statistical evidence of police failure to treat domestic violence
situations as they would treat any other assault will be a telling
factor in a determination of whether there is a policy of treating
these calls differently.' 44 If such statistics are combined with another
factor, such as evidence of police officers' inadequate training in
handling domestic violence situations, section 1983 liability for the
police will result.' 45
Some courts, in dealing with the issue of battered women who
receive inadequate police protection, have accurately anticipated the
DeShaney rule and held that a police department's repeated notice
of the victim's plight combined with its knowledge of the perpetra-
tor's identity is insufficient to establish a special relationship and
give rise to a section 1983 cause of action. 14° For example, in 1987,
the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
held in Turner v. City of North Charleston that the fact that a perpe-
trator was in legal custody prior to the incident did not establish a
141 Id. at 695. The plaintiff presented evidence showing that out of 608 nondomestic
assault cases in Kansas City, Kansas, from January I, 1983, to September 8, 1983, where
there was a known perpetrator, there were 186 arrests for an arrest rate of 31%. Out of 369
domestic assaults, there were only 69 arrests for a rate of 16%. Id.
142 Id. at 696. Such evidence tended to establish that the police were acting pursuant to
an official policy. Id. See supra note 131. See also Waits, supra note 7, at 311 (discussion of
how police tend to treat a domestic violence situation when called to it).
143 Watson, 857 F.2d at 697-98.
144 See id. at 695-96,
145 See id. at 696.
146 See Morgan v, District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306,1317-18 (D.C. App. 1983). The
Morgan court held that there was no special relationship between the police department and
the wife of a police officer who had been threatened by her husband with his service revolver
because the police captain did not affirmatively undertake the obligation of protecting the
officer's wife and the wife did not rely on the police captain to protect her. Id. This was not
a section 1983 case, but the analysis is quite similar.
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special relationship when the state had expressed no desire to pro-
vide affirmative protection to a specific group of individuals. 147
In Turner, a husband injured his wife in an ongoing domestic
dispute.'" The record in the Turner case indicated a series of quar-
rels at the house, with Ms. Turner being cut with a butcher knife,
assaulted, and raped. Ms. Turner was thereafter divorced from her
husband, Vernon Fair. She obtained a temporary restraining order
against him which was later made permanent.' 49 Subsequent to the
issuance of the order, Mr. Fair entered Ms. Turner's home and
threatened her with a knife. He also made phone calls to her,
threatening her safety and that of her children. At this point, Ms.
Turner phoned the City of North Charleston Police Department,
informing them not of the specific threats, but of her fear that Mr.
Fair might attempt to harm her.'" On the next day, Ms. Turner
phoned the police again and told them that Mr. Fair had just
telephoned and threatened her. 151
Ms. Turner and her children made two more calls over the
course of the day to tell the police that Mr. Fair was threatening
them, but the police simply responded that a warrant could not be
obtained over the phone.' 52 That evening, Mr. Fair entered Ms.
Turner's home, shot her several times in the head, and attempted
to shoot her son.'" The police at that point dispatched a car to the
area.
The Turner court held that these facts were insufficient to es-
tablish a special relationship between Ms. Turner and the police.154
According to the court, the qualified immunity defense protected
the police officers from section 1983 liability.' 55 In general, the
qualified immunity doctrine states that an official will not be held
liable for violating an individual's rights unless the right was so
clearly established and its contours so sharply defined at the time
of the action that a reasonable official would understand that he
147 675 F. Supp. 314,318-19 (D.S.C. 1987).
14a
	
at 317.
149
	
The order forbade Mr. Fah: from following Ms. Turner on foot or in an auto-
mobile, from physically abusing her, or harassing or harming her in any way. Id.
15° Id. Ms. Turner was to appear on the following day at a hearing regarding Mr. Fair's
probation violation. Id.
151 Id.
162 Id. at 317-18. All these calls involved requests for a patrol car to be sent to the area.
Id.
' 53 Id. at 318.
154 Id. at 319.
' 55 See id.
September 19891	 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE'	 1379
was violating that right.'" The Turner court reasoned that, due to
the absence of specific guidelines to determine when a special re-
lationship existed, the officers here, even acting reasonably, could
not have understood that their actions violated any rights. 157 In the
Turner court's view, a reasonable official would not understand that
he or she was violating someone's constitutional right by failing to
return telephone calls.'" Thus, the Turner court established that no
special relationship exists unless the state places the victim in the
position of danger or specifically singles out the victim and places
her in its care.' 59
Subsequent decisions that attempted to revive the importance
of restraining orders and the importance of police officers' knowl-
edge of threats to a specific victim are probably not good law after
DeShaney. A discussion of these cases is useful, however, in order to
understand the evolution of the special relationship concept up to
the DeShaney decision. In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held in Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department
that a restraining order together with the police department's re-
peated notice of the plaintiff's plight were sufficient to state a claim
that the police owed the plaintiff, Ms. Balistreri, a duty to take
reasonable measures to protect her from her estranged husband.'"
The factors were sufficient to establish a special relationship be-
tween Ms. Balistreri and the police and to hold them liable under
section 1983 for their failure to provide adequate protection.' 61
Initially, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California dismissed the complaint in the Balistreri case. 162
The district court held, in accordance with the Supreme Court's
subsequent DeShaney decision, that Ms. Balistreri had not alleged
' 56 See Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987); Harlow v, Fitzgerald, 102
S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982).
I57 675 F. Supp. at 319.
i5H Id. The state of South Carolina had enacted a "Protection from Domestic Abuse Act".
The court reconciled its holding with the statute by stating that "the Act does not appear to
create an initial, express duty of protection, or intervention, in domestic abuse cases, but
rather provides only that law enforcement officers take certain protective measures when
responding to a domestic abuse incident." Id. (emphasis added).
15" Turner, 675 F. Stipp. at. 319.
1 " 855 F.2d 1421, 1426 (9th Cir, 1988). But see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept
of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003-04 & n.4 (1989), rtff 'g 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Supreme Court held that a special relationship between the state and an individual can only
arise when the state places the individual in its custody).
15I See Balistreri, 855 F.2d at 1424-26.
' 52 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept, 656 F. Stipp. 423, 42(1 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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adequate facts to establish a special relationship.' 63 Because the state
had not assumed a custodial relationship over her,' 64
 or affirma-
tively placed her in danger or instigated the actions of her former
husband, the special relationship did not exist.'" The district court
went on to say that the police officers' awareness of Mr. Balistreri's
dangerous nature was not sufficient to establish a special relation-
ship between the police and Ms. Balistreri.'"
Judge Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit based her reversal of the
district court decision in Balistreri on two grounds: its failure to
consider whether the state had affirmatively undertaken any duty
to protect Balistreri; and its conclusion that the state's awareness of
the victim's plight will only give rise to a special relationship within
a custodial context. 167 The Balistreri court asserted that special re-
lationships may be found outside the custodial context.' 68
The DeShaney Court explicitly rejected this analysis and stated
that it is not the state's knowledge of an individual's dangerous
situation that gives rise to a duty to protect that individual, but only
the state's act of placing the individual in a custodial situation and
limiting that person's freedom to act on his or her own behalf.'•
Although DeShaney disapproved the special relationship Balistren
rule, Balistreri is still important for its contribution to the equal
protection component of police officers' reponse to battered
women. The Pacifica Police Department argued in Balistreri that Ms.
Balistreri's complaint contained no facts demonstrating discrimi-
nation against any class or that Ms. Balistreri was a member of any
class.'" The defendants correctly pointed out that a party asserting
a claim for equal protection must show intentional discrimination
by the state against a class of persons. 17 ' Defendants relied on the
165 Id. at 425.
1 " Id. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
16' Balistreri 656 F. Supp. at 425.
166 Id. at 426.
167 Id. See Escatnilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2c1 266, 269-70 (9th Cir. 1986). In
Escamilla, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that, in addition to the custodial context, a court
could also look at whether the state affirmatively committed itself to protecting the victim
and whether the state knew of the victim's plight. The DeShaney Court rejected this analysis.
166 Balistreri, 855 F.2d itt 1426.
16:'
	 v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1006 (1989),
aff 'g 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987).
176
 Brief for Appellees at 12, Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir.
1988) (No. 87-1969).
171 Id. at 13. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of
equal protection analysis.
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words of Ms. Balistreri's complaint to argue that she was treated
identically to any other member of the public.' 72
In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit conceded that Ms. Balistreri's
equal protection claim was not well pleaded and that there was no
specific claim that the defendants' conduct discriminated against
her based on her status as a female victim of domestic violence.'"
The Balistreri court was willing to overlook the poor drafting, how-
ever, and noted that sufficient facts were alleged to suggest discrim-
ination against Ms. Balistreri because she was a woman." The
Balistreri court pointed out that certain remarks made by the police
officers responding to one of Ms. Balistreri's assault complaints
strongly suggested an intention to treat domestic abuse cases less
seriously than other assaults and a certain animosity against abused
5women. 17
 -
In summary, the DeShaney decision severely limits the circum-
stances under which courts will find a special relationship to have
arisen between police officers and domestic violence victims. Factors
such as police knowledge that a person faces a special danger and
knowledge of the threatening party's identity are no longer suffi-
cient to establish a special relationship. Domestic violence victims
will be more successful in relying upon the equal protection analysis
used in Watson and Thurman. if a woman is able to establish that
police officers treat domestic violence calls differently than other
calls, she no longer needs to prove the existence of a special rela-
tionship.
III. A POSSII3LE SOLUTION FOR BATTERED WOMEN
As the roles of men and women in our society change, police
officers are more likely to be held accountable for failure to respond
and render assistance to battered women." The law no longer
accepts the idea that men have the right to use force in order to
"discipline" their wives.'" Because police officers are a battered
woman's initial hope for immediate and effective relief from severe
physical abuse, they play a particularly critical role in eradicating
in Brier for Appellees at 13, Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept, 855 F.2(1 1421 (9th Cir.
1988) (No. 87-1969).
173 Balistreri, 855 F.2d at 1427.
L74 Id .
175 Id .
17" See, e.g., Balistreri, 855 F.2d at 1426; Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1527.
17 See Waits, supra note 7, at '268-70.
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the problem of domestic violence.' 78 When the police fail to re-
spond, the courts and the legislature must be willing to impose
liability on the police for their inaction and thereby help battered
women.' 79
Battered women still have several legal theories under which
they can sue passive police officers under section 1983. If the courts
strive to limit DeShaney to its facts, the special relationship concept
may provide an avenue of relief for battered women who receive
no aid. Also, the law enforcement theory may still be an option
after DeShaney. Because the theory requires that the officer be close
to the scene before he or she has a duty to intervene on behalf of
the victim, however, it is of little help to battered women. The equal
protection argument is an effective one for battered women, and
recent decisions such as Watson seem quite receptive to it. The best
course of action is for state legislatures to enact statutes requiring
police officers to take affirmative steps to aid domestic violence
victims. Because the statutes impose clear duties, they are the most
effective way to combat the problem.
Courts faced with the problem of battered women and passive
police officers are now compelled to define the special relationship
without the benefit of the factors relied upon by the Balistreri,' 8°
Lowers,'" and Sherrell' 82 courts. The Balistreri court focused on ele-
ments such as the restraining order and the repeated calls for
assistance in defining the special relationship.'" The Balistreri court
stated that these elements were important in determining whether
a special relationship came into existence.' 84 In DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Department of Social Services, the United States Supreme
Court disapproved this line of reasoning.'" Because the DeShaney
Court held that a special relationship may only arise between the
state and an individual when the state assumes custody over that
individual,' 86 the Balistreri court's definition of special relationship
is probably no longer valid.
178 See id. at 308.
179 See id. at 298-329. Professor Waits states that: Inlo other social institution has the
legal system's clout to protect victims and to force batterers to face the consequences of their
transgressions." Id. at 302.
' 8" See Balistreri, 855 F.2d at 1426.
18 ' See Lowers v. City of Streator, 627 F. Supp. 244, 246 (N.D. III. 1985).
1 " 2 See Sherrell v. City of Longview, 683 F. Supp. 1108, 1113 (E.D. Tex. 1987).
I85 Balistreri, 855 F.2d at 1426.
184 Id.
1 " 5
 109 S. Ct. 998, 1005-06 (1989), aff k 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987).
181i Id.
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Thus, the DeShaney Court's holding leaves victims of domestic
violence like Ms. Balistreri at a severe disadvantage, unless these
women can afford to hire their own private protection. As Justice
Brennan stated in his dissent in DeShaney, the state need not have
direct physical control over an individual to hinder that individual's
ability to act on her own behalf.' 87 The Pacifica Police Department's
knowledge of the risk of harm to-Ms. Balistreri, combined with the
fact that they were public officers with the duty to aid citizens in
distress, precluded Ms. Balistreri from seeking assistance from other
sources.'" Thus, the police department in effect prevented Ms.
Balistreri from helping herself, but, according to DeShaney, should
not have been held liable for such action.
Limiting the special relationship to the custodial context, as the
United States Supreme Court did in DeShaney, will allow police
officers to escape liability for failing to aid battered women. Ac-
cording to the DeShaney Court's reasoning, the only women who will
have cognizable section 1983 claims against passive police officers
are those women who are already in a police officer's custody when
the abuse occurs.'" This remedy obviously offers little hope for
women. It is difficult to imagine a man inflicting harm upon a
woman who is in the protective custody of the police. As Justice
Brennan argued in dissent in DeShaney, the state's direct physical
control over an individual should not be the only situation in which
the state has a special duty to protect that individual.'"° Relief for
battered women must come, at least initially, from police officers,
and the state controls this avenue of relief 191 by controlling its police
officers. As Justice Brennan argued, when the state monopolizes a
certain area, certain positive duties should be and are imposed on
it. '" 2 Thus, when the state employs police officers to lend aid to
those in need, and the officers fail to fulfill their duties, the harmed
individuals should be allowed to bring a section 1983 action against
the police.
Nevertheless, extending the special relationship concept to a
situation where a woman is beaten and a police officer fails to
respond does not mean that police officers will always be liable for
1 " DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1009 (Brennan, j., dissenting).
'" See Balistreri, 855 F.2d at 1423. One of the officers investigating an incident at the
Balistreri home suggested to Ms. Balistreri that she hire a private investigator. Id,
189 See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
19°
 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191 1d. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142 Id.
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such inaction. Whether the officer had a duty to aid a particular
victim will necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. A court would want to examine the extent of the notice
to police, the action in which the officers were engaged when they
received the call, and the seriousness of the physical harm to the
woman.
In addition, the qualified immunity argument is available to
the police officer. 193 This argument will be successful if the special
relationship was not clearly established and the police officer could
not have known of its existence. Thus, the qualified immunity pro-
tection is potentially available to the police officer in every case, no
matter what definition of special relationship a court utilizes. An
argument for an expansive special relationship concept is not an
argument for more liablity on police officers, but one for greater
protection for battered women.
Clearly, Justice Brennan's special relationship concept will go
further in deterring domestic violence than the theory that requires
police to act as a result of their law enforcement authority.'" The
court in Huey v. Barloga utilized this law enforcement theory in
refusing to find the police officers liable under section 1983.'"" The
Huey) court would have required a specific omission by the police
that caused the injury, and notice of the possibility of danger to the
plaintiff was insufficient."'" Such a requirement would limit the
extent to which battered women could use this theory.
The court in Byrd v. Brishhe held the police officers liable under
this law enforcement theory.'"7 The Byrd court's analysis, however,
relied upon the fact that the incident took place right in the very
presence of the offending officers.'" The analysis approached the
requirement of a custodial situation between the victim and the
police officers. Although the Byrd court did state that a police officer
would have a duty to intervene even if the action was not in his
presence but "otherwise within his knowledge," the court never
defined the limits of this part of the test.' 99 Therefore, even the
"'' See Turner v. City of North Charleston, 675 F. Supp. 314, 319 (I).S.C. 1987). See
supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of qualified immunity.
"" See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the law enfUrcement
theory.
' 95 277 F. Supp. 864, 873 (N.D. 111. 1967).
1 "6 Id.
) " 7 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1972).
I" See id.
' 99 Id.
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Byrd court's analysis provides little help to a battered woman who
sends a call for help to a police officer who is some distance away.
Further, it is not clear whether this prong of the test would be
a viable source of relief for battered women against passive police
officers after DeShaney. The DeShaney Court rejected the argument
that a special relationship existed simply because the state knew that
the victim faced a special danger of abuse. 2°" Although the Court
was not addressing the law enforcement theory used in Byrd, it
would seem that a police officer's mere knowledge of potential
danger to a person would be an insufficient basis for section 1983
liability under any theory. Because the DeShaney Court required
more than mere knowledge in the special relationship context, any
argument that relies only on knowledge will likely fail.
In any event, because the law enforcement theory requires close
proximity of the officer to the scene21 ' and showings of specific
omissions and causal connections, 202 it would be more difficult for
battered women to use it in establishing section 1983 liability of
police officers for failure to act. Thus, it suffers from the same
deficiency as the special relationship concept that the United States
Supreme Court promulgated in DeShaney. 2" Indeed, one of the
more positive aspects of the special relationship concept, as Justice
Brennan defined it in his DeShaney dissent, 2" is that the victim can
take steps in establishing it by notifying the police of the danger
that she faces. 205 Courts should therefore heed the suggestions of
the 'Balistreri court and Justice Brennan's DeShaney dissent and ex-
tend the special relationship test beyond the custodial context to
protect battered women.
Despite the DeShaney decision, however, the equal protection
argument still remains a strong one for battered women. 20" Its
200 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004.
"' See Byrd, 466 F.2d at 11.
202 See Huey, 277 F. Supp. at 873.
• 2"1 109 S. Ct. at 1004-05.
"4 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1009-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
205 See Balistreri v, Pacifica Police Dept, 855 F.2d 1421, 1426 (9th Cir. 1988) (An
important factor to the court was the police officers' repeated notice of Ms. Balistreri's plight,
notice that she provided herself.); Thurman v, City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1525
(1984) (Ms. Thurman made numerous calls and cotnplaints to the police about the abuse she
was receiving).
246 In footnote S of the DeShaney opinion, the Court noted that selective denial of
protective services to certain classes 1,vo,dd violate the equal protection clause. DeShaney, 109
S. Ct. at 1004 n.3. According to the Court, Ms. DeShaney failed to make the equal protection
argument.. Id.
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strength lies not only in the courts' willingness to use it, but in their
expansive concept of equal protection as applied to battered women.
The Balistreri court's equal protection analysis suggests that it will
look to two separate areas in defining a class. First, it would examine
the class of people who are victims of domestic violence to see if
they are treated differently than other assault victims. 207 Then it
would look to women to see if they are treated differently than men
in a similar situation. 208 The Balistreri court's broad definition of
class will serve as an effective vehicle for battered women who
receive insufficient police protection to bring section 1983 claims
against officers.2""
The Tenth Circuit in Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kansas also
engaged in this two-track analysis. 21 " The Watson court was willing
to consider statistical data in reaching its conclusion that the defen-
dants provided less police protection to victims of domestic assault
than to other assault victims. 2 " The Watson court reached this con-
clusion despite the plaintiff's failure to show that the classification
was adopted purposefully to discriminate against women.212 Thus,
the Balistreri and Watson courts established that a battered woman
is a member of two classes. This rule will substantially increase a
woman's chances of obtaining section 1983 relief against passive
police officers who have breached their duty by failing to provide
protection.
This two-pronged definition of class is an effective way for the
courts to combat the problem of police failure to respond to do-
mestic violence calls. It will help to protect all victims of domestic
violence, not just women. 213 Because there is likely to be more
evidence available on police responses to specific kinds of calls, such
as the statistics used in the Watson case, than on police officers'
treatment of women in general, discrimination against domestic
violence will be easier to prove from an evidentiary point of view
than discrimination against women. In addition, police will be liable
under section 1983 for their inaction, even in the absence of a
purpose to discriminate against women. 2 " Such a broad definition
Balistreri, 855 F.2d at 1427.
2(18 See id.
2U"
	 id.
210 857 F.2d 690,696-97 (10th Cir. 1988).
Ill See id. at 695-96.
212 Id. at 697.
21] See Sherrell v. City of Longview, 683 F. Supp. 1108,1113 (E.D. Tex. 1987).
214 See Watson, 857 F.2d at 696-97.
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of class not only will provide domestic violence victims and specifi-
cally women with two theories of recovery against the police under
section 1983, but it will also send a message to police officers of
how seriously the courts treat this problem. Thus, the Balistreri
court's two-class analysis for women victimized by domestic violence
extends the equal protection analysis of Thurman v. City of Torrington,
where the court concentrated specifically on women as a class and
not on all victims of domestic violence as a separate class. 215
Nevertheless, the emerging use of equal protection analysis to
hold police officers liable under section 1983 for failure to act does
not negate or even minimize the need for statutes that will impose
a duty on police officers, not only to aid battered women, but to
make arrests in domestic violence situations. 216 The enactment of
such statutes is the most effective way to combat the problem of
police inaction. Failure to comply with the statutory requirements
will result in section 1983 liability. Johnson v. Duffy illustrated the
effectiveness of statutorily defined duties on police officers. 217
 The
Johnson court had little difficulty in holding that the sheriff had a
legal duty to act because the duty was defined in the statute:218
As commentators have pointed out, arresting the perpetrator
will insure the safety of the victim as well as help to cairn the
perpetrator by removing him from the scene. 219 By mandating ar-
rest, domestic violence statutes benefit all parties. Certainly the
victim benefits by the removal of the perpetrator from her pres-
ence. 22° The perpetrator also benefits because he will be prevented
from inflicting further injury. And lastly,• the police will benefit
because they will not have to question the propriety of an arrest
from situation to situation. Their duty will be clearly defined, and
they need only carry it out.
The existence of such statutes will further enable courts to
establish the causal connection between the police officer's failure
215 595 F. Supp, 1521, 1527 (D. Conn. 1984). The Thurman court concentrated upon
women who are victims of domestic violence. Id.
216 See supra note 119 for examples of some of these statutes, See also Note, Domestic
Violence: Legislative and Judicial Remedies, 2 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 167, 167-86 (1979).
21.1 588 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1978). See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Johnson.
see Johnson, 588 F.2d at 744. But see Turner v. City of North Charleston, 675 F. Supp.
314, 318-19 (D.S.C. 1987) (court gave a strained interpretation to a Protection from Domestic
Abuse Act to relieve the police officers from liability for failure to act).
219 See Waits, supra note 7, at 308-19. (an extensive analysis of why arrest is one of the
most effective ways to combat the problem of abuse against women).
22" Id. at 309.
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to act and the battered woman's injury. If a domestic violence statute
specifically imposes upon the police officer a duty to arrest and
remove the perpetrator, and the police officer fails to do so, then
any further injury inflicted upon a woman may be directly attri-
buted to the officer's failure to act. The courts will not have to
struggle with the issue of whether a failure to act may "cause" a
person to be deprived of his or her constitutional rights within the
meaning of section 1983, 221 because the causal link will be estab-
lished in the statute itself. Thus, such statutes may greatly enhance
the protection available to battered women.
Of course police officers may protest and claim that the pres-
ence of such statutes will subject them to liability more often if they
fail to make arrests. If a court employs equal protection analysis or
the special relationship analysis as enunciated in Justice Brennan's
DeShaney dissent, the police still may argue absence of intention to
treat a member of a class differently222 and qualified immunity, 223
and thus escape liability. With a statutorily defined duty, however,
it would be more difficult for police officers to make such argu-
ments. 224 Again, the main objective is not to impose liability upon
police officers, but to afford battered women more protection and
to proiiide them with a theory of relief when they do not receive
such protection. In the final analysis, the clear enunciation of duty
and removal of doubt would seem to be more beneficial to police
officers. Thus, the enactment of such statutes can further aid
women in their need for police protection from physical abuse.
IV. CoNCLOSION
Domestic violence, particularly violence against women, is a
serious problem. A major hindrance in combatting this violence has
been anti-women attitudes that accepted such behavior. Police of-
ficers were not expected to take actions to prevent violence against
women, at least not to the extent that they were expected to combat
other assault situations.
Courts have employed several methods of analysis in order to
hold police officers liable for failure to act in certain situations. The
enactment of section 1983 made it even more difficult for police
221 See supra note 4 for the full text of section 1983.
222 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of this requirement
in an equal protection claim.
22s
	 supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of qualified immunity.
224 See Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1978).
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officers to escape liability. The courts have begun to enunciate
clearly the circumstances necessary to hold police officers liable for
failure to act. Although DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services limits the situations in which section 1983 plaintiffs
may establish a special relationship, Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion provides fertile ground for such plaintiffs to try and per-
suade courts that the decision should be narrowly interpreted.
The best solution to remedy the uncertainty is for state legis-
latures to draft statutes that require police officers to provide affir-
mative protection to victims of domestic violence and to make ar-
rests when arriving at the scene of the violence. A statutorily defined
duty provides clarity for both police officers and domestic violence
victims as to the extent of the police officer's required actions and
the possibility of liability for failure to act. Many states have already
enacted statutes requiring protection and even arrest of the per-
petrator, but more needs to be done. It would be unfortunate if
police officers were subject to civil liability more frequently as a
result of the passage of such statutes. It would be even more un-
fortunate, however, if battered women continue to receive no help
from police officers.
GARY M. BISHOP
